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ST. JOHN'S LAW REVIEW
and thus warrant punitive damages. The soundness of the
punitive damages policy is now directly in issue since the court,
by setting the stage for an actual award of punitive damages,
terminated the ambivalence of New York's position.
While this development is significant from the scholar's point
of view, it is of lesser import in a practical sense. The scarcity
of reported punitive damages cases itself testifies that few such
cases have ever reached the courts, probably for practical reasons.
Conduct which might possibly be called "gross negligence" un-
questionably constitutes ordinary negligence. A defendant guilty
of such conduct would probably offer a substantial settlement
to avoid potential punitive liability. To a plaintiff, a large immediate
settlement would offer an attractive alternative to a recovery,
which, though possibly larger, would come after years of delay.
Furthermore, since most automobile liability insurance policies
do not cover punitive damages,"4 such a recovery could be an
empty victory. It is doubted, therefore, that the recent case will
provide a sufficient incentive to offset these practical considerations
and thereby effect a countertrend. However, in the rare case,
that does reach court, 35 Soucy will provide direct authority for
granting punitive damages.
CPLR 3018(b).: Amendment allowed to insert an
affirnative defense.
CPLR 3018(b) provides that certain matters, "which if not
pleaded would be likely to take the adverse party by surprise . . .,"
must be pleaded as affirmative defenses under penalty of being
waived.36  However, the apparent severity of this section is
alleviated by the liberal provisions for amending pleadings in
CPLR 3025.
This is illustrated by the recent decision in Rainone v. France.3 7
There the defendant in a negligence action had failed to include
the defense of general release in his original answer because he
was unaware that plaintiff had accepted $425 to release defendant's
joint tortfeasor. Upon learning of tis release four and one-half
months later, the defendant applied to the court for permission
to amend his answer. Although section 3018(b) specifically
applies to the defense of release, the court permitted the amend-
worn tires, was speeding, had a defective transmission, and had defective
windshield wipers.
34 Logan, Punitive Damages in Automobile Cases, 1961 INs. LJ. 27, 30.
35 E.g., where defendant mistakenly feels he has a debatable affirmative
defense such as contributory negligence or assumption of risk.36 The section gives several examples of such matters, but expressly
provides that those enumerated are not exclusive.
3 26 App. Div. 2d 855, 273 N.Y.S.2d 828 (3d Dep't 1966).
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ment since "plaintiff . . . could not convincingly claim surprise
or prejudice." Thus,
the waiver rule may be operable only when the failure to plead
affirmatively has prejudiced the plaintiff in a manner that cannot be
remedied by the court by the award of costs, or a continuance, or
some other sanction.33
ARTICLE 31 - DISCLOSURE
CPLR Art. 31.: Disclosure under court rule.
Kovalenko v. Dilberian 9 is an example of disclosure being
sought under court rule rather than under the CPLR.4 0 In that
action for personal injuries, plaintiff moved, pursuant to Rule III,
Part Four, Rules of the Appellate Division, Second Department,
for an order directing the defendant to serve a copy of an examina-
tion of the plaintiff conducted by the defendant's insurance carrier.
The defendant, however, explained that this examination was made
in relation to plaintiff's claim under her own medical coverage
insurance written by that same company.
The court, in denying the plaintiff's motion, noted that since
the carrier did not examine the plaintiff as defendant's repre-
sentative, there was no report available subject to plaintiff's motion.
The court also held that the findings of the examination made
by the insurer were unavailable to the defendant.
CPLR 3101(a).: Discovery of the amount of insuranwe itwt allowed.
In Gold v. Jacobi,41 an automobile negligence action, the
plaintiff sought discovery of the amount of defendant's automobile
liability insurance. The court, however, held that this information
was not subject to discovery since it was not "material and
necessary" in the prosecution of the case.
Although the court noted that this was a case of first im-
pression, a case decided under the CPA lends support to this
decision.42 There it was held that information such as the amount
of insurance coverage could not be elicited at an examination
before trial since it was not related to the issues in the case.
38 3 WEINSTEIN, KORN & MILLER, NEW YORK CrvI PAcncE 3018.18
(1966).
39 51 Misc. 2d 625, 273 N.Y.S.2d 642 (Sup. Ct. Suffolk County 1966).
40 CPLR 3121(b).
4149 Misc. 2d 206, 276 N.Y.S.Zd 309 (Sup. Ct. N.Y. County 1966).
42Milk Tank Serv., Inc. v. Wood, 200 Misc. 333, 107 N.Y.S.2d 166 (Sup.
Ct. Sullivan County 1951).
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